





















Abstract: A vast literature documents better economic institutions in common law 
compared with civil law countries. The present paper argues that legal origin alone is 
insufficient to explain differences in the quality of economic institutions across countries. 
Rather, it is the interaction between legal origin and the quality of political institutions 
that is important. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of 90 countries on entry 
regulation, a measure of how business friendly economic institutions are towards firms, 
strongly supports our claim. For example, we find that the number of procedures required 
to start a business are lower in common law compared with civil law countries by 2.5 
procedures or 24.3% of the sample mean. However, this difference varies sharply across 
the sample of countries with high and low levels of political accountability. It equals a 
large 3.4 procedures (37% of the sample mean) for the former and a mere 1.1 procedures 
(9.7% of the sample mean) for the latter. We conclude that legal origin matters for the 
quality of economic institutions but only when political accountability is high. We 
provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon based on recent findings in the 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large literature that links the quality of economic institutions, governance and 
the business environment to the legal origin of countries. Specifically, studies find that 
relative to civil law, common law countries have fewer restrictions on the entry of new 
businesses (Djankov et al. 2002), better quality of contract enforcement and protection of 
private property (Djankov et al. 2003a), more flexible labor markets (Botero et al. 2004), 
less corruption (Treisman 2000) and more developed financial institutions (La Porta et al. 
1997, Djankov et al. 2008).
1 The present paper argues that legal origin alone is 
insufficient to explain differences in the quality of economic institutions across countries. 
Rather, it is the interaction between legal origin and the quality of political institutions 
that is important. We provide supportive evidence using data on the regulation of new 
businesses across 90 civil and common law countries. 
  The existing studies mentioned above attribute heavier regulation of businesses 
and more generally, greater state involvement, in civil law compared with common law 
countries to historical differences between the two legal traditions. The English common 
law developed the way it did to protect private property and private freedom against the 
crown. Independent judiciary and a system of decentralized law-making where judges 
had broad powers to interpret and change laws were put in place as effective checks on 
the government. In contrast, the French civil law developed the way it did to promote 
state control. Legislators drafted laws without gaps that would otherwise afford judges 
the opportunity to re-interpret or change them. The marginalization of the judiciary as a 
check on the government helped extend state control of the economy. 
                                                 
1 For an excellenent survey of these and related studies, see, for example, La Porta et al. (2008).   2
It is natural to expect business regulations to be lower in countries with better 
legal institutions that prevent the use of such regulations by politicians to generate rents.
2 
However, this effect is likely to be much stronger when (weak) political institutions do 
not allow for an easy escape route to the rent-seeking politicians. In other words, moving 
from civil to common law may do little to lower the level of business regulation unless 
the country has developed political institutions that hold politicians accountable for what 
they do and don’t do. We treat this as our main hypothesis and test it using data on entry 
regulations, a measure of how business friendly economic institutions are and the focus 
of recent studies following the seminal work of Djankov et al. (2002). To fix ideas, we 
provide a glimpse of what the data say. For brevity, we focus here on a single indicator of 
the quality of entry regulation, number of procedures required to start a business (Doing 
Business, World Bank), and a single measure of political accountability, number of 
constraints on the executive (Polity IV). Djankov et al. (2002) discuss the stated measure 
of entry regulation in detail and show that it is much higher (more heavy regulation) in 
civil law compared with common law countries. 
Figure 1 shows the difference in the number of procedures required to start a 
business between common and civil law countries and how this difference varies between 
the set of countries that have above median (high political accountability) and below 
median (low political accountability) values of the number of constraints on the 
executive. Briefly, for the full sample, the number of procedures averages 10.3: 11.2 for 
the civil law countries and 8.7 for the common law countries. That is, the difference 
                                                 
2 There are two contrasting theories, the public interest theory and the public choice theory, on why 
governments regulate the entry of new businesses. The public interest theory contends that entry 
regulations are a response to market failures (Pigou 1938) while the public choice theory views such 
regulations as a source of rents to politicians (Tullock 1967, Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976). Djankov et al. 
(2002) look at both these explanations and find evidence in favor of the public choice theory.   3
between common and civil law countries equals 2.5 procedures or 24.3% of the sample 
mean. However, for the sample of countries with low political accountability, the 
difference equals 1.1 procedures (11.7 for civil law and 10.6 for common law) or 9.7% of 
the sample mean (11.3 procedures). For countries with high political accountability, the 
difference is a large 3.4 procedures (10.7 for civil law and 7.3 for common law) or 37% 
of the sample mean (9.2 procedures). We note that the pattern of regulation in the figure 
is preserved when we use alternative measures of business regulation and/or political 
accountability. Examples include cost of starting a business as a percentage of per capita 
income (Doing Business project), number of days it takes to start a business (Doing 
Business project), Business Freedom index (Heritage Foundation), cost of closing a 
business (Doing Business project, World Bank) and the number of veto players (Database 
of Political Institutions, World Bank). Findings using these variables are discussed in 
detail in the sections that follow.
3 
Recent contributions to the political economy literature provide some theoretical 
insights on the empirical approach of this paper. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue 
that there are different ways in which social groups and politicians come to acquire 
power. For example, power may be allocated by formal institutions (de jure political 
power) or acquired as a result of an individual’s wealth, weapons, ability to solve 
collective action problems and capture political parties (de facto political power). 
                                                 
3 One concern with the legal and political variables discussed above may be that they capture the same 
phenomenon. That is, higher political accountability could be a direct outcome of the greater emphasis on 
private freedom vis-à-vis state control in the common law compared with civil law countries. If this were 
true, it would complicate the identification of the effect of legal origin by the level of political 
accountability on the level of regulation. However, the data do not validate this concern. For example, the 
correlation between the common law dummy and the number of constraints on the executive is a mere 
0.171. We note the low correlation between legal origin and the quality of political institutions is consistent 
with other studies in the related literature (see, for example, Djankov et al. 2002, La Porta et al. 2008). The 
full set of correlations is provided in Table 3 and discussed below.   4
Interestingly, the authors argue that political reforms that alter the distribution of de jure 
power may have little effect on economic outcomes due to offsetting changes in de facto 
political power. More generally, checks and balances on politician’s behavior work better 
in conjunction with one another than individually. In the context of the present paper, this 
broad principle suggests that a move from civil law to common law is likely to be 
effective in creating a less burdensome (to firms) web of entry regulations when political 
accountability is sufficiently high but not otherwise. 
  Our empirical results clearly support this line of thinking. We look at three 
different measures of entry regulation and two different measures of political 
accountability in a cross-section of 90 countries. Our results show that common law 
countries regulate entry of new businesses less than civil law countries but this difference 
between civil and common law countries is significant and economically large only when 
political accountability is high. When political accountability is low or roughly below its 
median value, difference in the level of entry regulation between civil and common law 
countries is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. For example, evaluated at 
the 25
th and 75
th percentile values of the number of constraints on the executive, a move 
from civil to common law lowers the (log of) number of procedures required to start a 
business by 0.014 and 0.438 (against the sample mean number of procedures of 2.27), 
respectively. These findings are highly robust to a number of controls including per 
capita income, human capital, country-size, etc. 
We pay due attention to the potential endogeneity problems with our empirical 
results. In addition to using sufficiently lagged values of the political accountability 
measures (to address reverse causality) and a number of controls (to address omitted   5
variable bias), we also instrument for political constraints using a measure of newspaper 
readership. The instrument is motivated by a strand of the political economy literature 
that suggests a strong role of media in supporting higher levels of political accountability. 
When private agents are dispersed, media diffusion can help monitor the activities of 
incumbent politicians raising the level of political accountability in the country 
(Stromberg 2004, Besley and Prat 2007, Djankov et al. 2003c). Perotti and Volpin (2007) 
look at the diffusion of newspaper readership as a measure of access to information and 
note that it is a strong proxy for the degree of private scrutiny on political decisions even 
after controlling for differences in income levels across countries. Following this body of 
work, we use (lagged values of) newspaper readership as an instrument for the level of 
political accountability. Our results show a strong relationship between newspaper 
readership and political accountability measures and that this relationship easily survives 
controls for income, education, country-size, etc. 
It might be possible to extend the logic of the story above to other economic 
institutions and we find some evidence of this for the cost of closing a business. 
However, some caution is necessary in interpreting the findings of this paper too broadly. 
For example, laws on enforcement of contracts between private agents do not necessarily 
lend themselves to generation of rents by politicians, and therefore, may not be affected 
by the degree of political accountability. The same can be said of laws that protect small 
investors and labor. A case by case analysis of these economic institutions along the lines 
of the present paper is required to see if they follow a pattern similar to what we find 
below. We leave this broader task for future research.   6
To sum up the key contribution of our paper, while the existing literature (e.g. 
Djankov et al. 2002, La Porta et al. 2008) shows that legal origin matters in explaining 
economic institutions even after controlling for political institutions, these studies ignore 
the interaction between legal and political institutions. They implicitly assume that legal 
origin has the same effect on economic institutions whether political institutions are weak 
or strong. In contrast, the present paper shows the importance of  studying the interaction 
between legal origin and political institutions.  In particular, legal origin is irrelevant for 
explaining the regulation of entry in the presence of weak political constraints. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the main 
variables and provide summary statistics. Section 3 contains the main empirical findings 
while robustness checks are discussed in section 4. A summary of the main findings of 
the paper along with a discussion on the potential caveats to our results and scope for 
future work is provided in the concluding section. 
 
2. Data and main variables 
A definition of all the variables used in the regressions is provided in Table 1. Summary 
statistics of the main variables are contained in Table 2. The data are a cross-section of 90 
countries that follow the English common law or the French civil law.
4 These data are 
collected from various sources such as the World Bank (Doing Business project, World 
Development Indicators, Database of Political Institutions), La Porta et. al. (1999), Polity 
IV and Heritage Foundation. 
 
                                                 
4 We leave out countries with Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origins, a common practice in the 
literature. See, for example, La Porta et al. (2008).   7
2.1 Dependent variable 
Our main dependent variable is a measure of entry regulation across countries taken from 
the World Bank’s Doing Business project. It equals the (log of) number of procedures 
required to start a business, averaged over the all years (2003-2007) for which data are 
available (Procedures). The mean value of Procedures equals 2.27 and the standard 
deviation equals 0.43.  
For robustness, we look at another measure of entry regulation, the cost of starting 
a business as measured by the Doing Business project. As for Procedures, we use the 
(log of) average value of the cost of starting a business (as a percentage of country’s per 
capita income) over all years for which data are available (Cost). We also experimented 
with two other measures which include the time it takes to complete all registration 
requirements in order to start a business (Doing Business project) and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Business Freedom Index. Regression results using these two variables are 
roughly similar to the ones for Procedures and Cost and are discussed briefly in the 
section on robustness. 
  As mentioned in the introduction, we provide some evidence on another economic 
institution, the cost of closing a business as measured by the Doing Business project. We 
use the (log of) average value of the cost of closing a business (expressed as a percentage 
of the estate’s value) over all years for which data are available. The mean value of the 
variable is 2.64 and the standard deviation equals 0.62. 
 
2.2 Explanatory variables   8
The main explanatory variables include legal origin of a country, a measure of political 
accountability and the interaction of legal origin and the political accountability measure 
(henceforth, main interaction term). The remaining explanatory variables are in the nature 
of standard controls motivated by existing work on regulation, legal origin and political 
institutions. Among others, these variables include the main religion of the country, per 
capita income, human capital and total population (country-size). 
 
2.2.1 Legal Origin 
For legal origin, we use a dummy variable, English, that equals 1 for a country whose 
legal structure is based on the English common law and 0 otherwise (French civil law 
country). In the full sample, there are 31 common law and 59 civil law countries. Data 
source for English is La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
2.2.2 Political accountability 
There are a number of variables that capture various aspects of the quality of political 
institutions. The most commonly used one among these is the number of constraints on 
the executive (from Polity IV database) which is also our main measure of the level of 
political accountability across countries. In order to minimize problems due to reverse 
causality, we use lagged values of the number of constraints on the executive averaged 
over the period 1980-1989 (Constraints). Constraints varies between 1 and 7 with higher 
values implying greater political accountability. In our sample, the mean value of the 
variable equals 3.85 and the standard deviation is 1.82.   9
One potential shortcoming of the index on executive constraints is that it is a 
subjective measure based on experts’ opinion. To alleviate this concern, we use an 
alternative index of political accountability, Checks, developed by Beck et al. (1999) and 
averaged over the period 1980-1989. This index is a count of the number of veto players, 
based on whether the executive and legislative chamber(s) are controlled by different 
parties in presidential systems, and on the number of parties in government for 
parliamentary systems. The index is further modified to take account of the fact that 
certain electoral rules will affect the cohesiveness of governing coalitions. Checks varies 
between 0 and 7.1 in our sample with higher values of the variable implying greater 
political accountability. The mean value of Checks equals 2.05 and the standard deviation 
is 1.37. 
 
2.3 Other controls 
Since legal origin is predetermined and we use lagged values of the political 
accountability measures, reverse causality from the level of regulation to our main 
explanatory variables is unlikely. However, a relatively more serious concern with our 
findings could arise from a failure to control for other relevant variables (omitted variable 
bias) such as income and education (discussed in detail below). To this end, we show that 
our main results are robust to a number of controls such as income, education, regional 
fixed effects, country-size and the main religion of the country. For income, we use (log 
of) GDP per capita (PPP adjusted, constant 2000 USD) averaged over the period 1990-
1999 (Income) and taken from the World Development Indicators, World Bank. For 
education, we follow Glaeser et al. (2004) and use (log of) primary enrollment rate,   10
average values over the 1990-1999 period (Education). Data source for the variable is 
World Development Indicators, World Bank. The remaining controls are described in 
detail in the next two sections. 
 
3. Main results 
3.1 Estimation without controls 
Our main regression results are provided in Tables 4-6. These are based on Procedures as 
the dependent variable and Constraints as the political accountability measure. 
Estimation method used is the ordinary least squares with Huber-White robust standard 
errors. 
  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that without any other controls, common law 
and higher political accountability are associated with lower number of procedures to 
start a business. For example, a move from civil to common law lowers the value of 
Procedures by 0.313 (column 1, Table 4) or 14% of the mean value of the dependent 
variable. The effect is significant at 1% level. Similarly, a move from the lowest to the 
highest value of Constraints lowers Procedures by 0.672 or 30% of the mean of the latter 
(column 2, Table 4). The change is significant at 1% level. Both these variables continue 
to show significant effects (at 1% level) on the dependent variable when we include them 
simultaneously in the specification (column 3, Table 4). In column 4 of Table 4 we 
include our main interaction term. Regression results in the column show that the 
interaction term is economically large and statistically significant (at 1% level). The 
effect of common law on Procedures varies between 0.191 (p-value of 0.128) for the 
lowest value of Constraints and a large -0.687 (p-value of 0.002) for the highest value of   11
Constraints. Figure 2 provides a full picture of the variation in the effect of legal origin 
on the dependent variable along with the 95% confidence interval.  
 
3.2 Estimation with Regional Dummies 
The estimates presented so far could suffer from potential omitted variable bias. That is, 
some omitted variable could be driving both low political accountability and high 
regulation in common law countries.  For example, Panel A of Table 3 reveals a high 
correlation between political accountability and the level of income and education. As 
well, Djankov et al. (2002) find a significant negative relationship between income level 
and entry regulation. They note that controlling for GDP per capita is a “critical” test for 
the robustness of the relationship between legal origin, political institutions and the level 
of regulation
5. 
  The high correlation between political accountability and the level of income and 
education mentioned above suggests a broader problem. That is, aspects of overall 
development not fully captured by income and education levels may also be correlated 
with political accountability and regulation. This source of omitted variable bias cannot 
be eliminated by merely controlling for income and education levels. Below we argue 
that the inclusion of regional dummies alleviates this concern.  
A closer inspection of the correlation between political variables and income, 
education reveals an interesting pattern across and within three major regions: Africa, 
Western Europe and North America, and the rest of the world. That is, a relatively larger 
chunk of the variation in the political variables occurs within than across these three 
                                                 
5 Similarly, Glaeser et al. (2004) find that effect of political institutions on growth becomes much weaker 
(and statistically insignificant) when one controls for the level of human capital. 
   12
regions. However, it is the variation across the regions, and especially across Europe and 
North America (11 countries) and the rest, that drives the high overall correlation 
between education, income and the political variables. To see this, we first provide 
correlations between the various variables dropping the 11 Western European and North 
American countries from the sample (Panel B, Table 3). Note that the correlation 
between income, education and the political variables is much smaller in this restricted 
sample (Panel B, Table 3) than in the full sample (Panel A, Table 3). Next, starting with 
the full sample, we regress each variable on the regional dummies and take the residuals. 
Correlations between these residuals are reported in panel C of Table 3 while correlation 
between the original values of the variables and their respective residuals are reported in 
Panel D of Table 3. In Panel C we find that the correlation between the political variables 
and income and education are only moderate in magnitude suggesting that differences in 
these variables are correlated across rather than within the three regions. Further, all 
correlations in Panel D are high implying that much of the variation in our main variables 
occurs within than across the three regions. 
  The findings discussed above allow us to use a parsimonious specification for our 
main regression results without causing much serious concern about the omitted variable 
bias problem. That is, we control for regional fixed effects: Africa and Europe & North 
America. The rest of the world is the omitted category. 
Regression results reported in column 5 of Table 4 show that the regional fixed 
effects do not change our main results much from above. In fact, the estimated coefficient 
of the interaction term becomes stronger, increasing (in absolute value) from -0.146 
(column 4, Table 4) to -0.160 (column 5, Table 4). As above, the effect of English on   13
Procedures is statistically insignificant and positive at the lowest value of Constraints but 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level for the highest value of Constraints. 
To get a sense of how widespread the effect of legal origin on entry regulation  is, 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the critical value of Constraints above which common law has 
a statistically significant (at 5% level) negative effect on the dependent variable. Without 
the regional fixed effects the critical value equals 3.15 (47
th percentile value), while with 
regional effects it is 2.99 (44
th percentile value). In other words, common law is 
associated with a significantly lower number of procedures to start a business for the 
highest 53-56% of the values of Constraints. 
We also experimented with dropping the Western European and North American 
countries from the sample but this did not change our results much. For example, the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term in Table 4 increased in absolute value from -
0.160 for the full sample (column 5, Table 4) to -0.172 (p-value of 0.011) for the 
restricted sample. Given that differences in income levels and overall development are 
particularly sharp between Western European and North American countries relative to 
the rest of the world, the results reported above suggest that it is extremely unlikely that 
our main interaction term is spuriously picking up income, education and overall 
development related effects on regulation. 
 
3.3 Estimation with other controls 
Results of estimation with other controls are provided in Table 5. We begin by showing 
that our results are robust to controls for income and education. In column 1 of Table 5 
we control for both these variables. The estimated coefficient of our main interaction   14
term changes only marginally from -0.160 (column 5, Table 4) to -0.152 (column 1, 
Table 5) and remains significant at 1% level. Similarly, there is very little change in the 
estimated coefficients of English and Constraints. For example, for the latter, the 
coefficient value changes from 0.014 (column 5, Table 4) to 0.012 (column 1, Table 5). 
This is in sharp contrast to Glaeser et al. (2004) who show that controlling for education 
destroys the otherwise large effect of the quality of political institutions on economic 
growth. One reason for this could be that while education may affect growth through 
increased R&D and higher worker productivity, there is no obvious link between 
education and entry regulation. If this is indeed true then the issue of political institutions 
spuriously picking up the effect of human capital on regulation is less credible. We note 
that the estimated coefficient of education is statistically insignificant and economically 
small in column 1 of Table 5 and also elsewhere in the paper. 
One concern with the findings so far could be that the differential effect of legal 
origin across countries with low and high levels of political accountability that we found 
above is spuriously the differential effect of legal origin across countries with low and 
high levels of income and/or education. This source of omitted variable bias for our main 
interaction term is not ruled out by simply controlling for the level of income and 
education as we did above. Hence, we extend our specification by controlling for the 
interaction term between English and Income as well as Education. Regression results 
controlling for these additional interaction terms are reported in column 2 of Table 5. 
These results clearly show that there is no significant difference in the effect of legal 
origin on Procedures across rich and poor countries and across countries with low and 
high levels of education. More importantly, the estimated coefficient of our main   15
interaction term still survives. It declines (in absolute value) but only marginally from -
0.152 (column 1, Table 5) to -0.132 (p-value of 0.018, column 2, Table 5). 
  As documented in the broader literature on legal origins, income and education 
levels do not vary much with the legal origin of countries. For our sample of countries, 
the correlation between English and Income equals 0.137 and -0.018 between English and 
Education. These correlations are relatively small and suggest that it is unlikely that our 
main interaction term is picking up the differential effect of political accountability across 
rich and poor countries or across countries with high and low levels of education. We 
confirm this view by controlling for the interaction term between Constraints and Income 
and between Constraints and Education. Regression results reported in column 3 of 
Table 5 show that these additional controls do not change our main result much. The 
estimated coefficient of our main interaction term still remains negative and significant at 
less than 5% although it declines moderately in magnitude from -0.132 (column 2, Table 
5) to -0.109 (column 3, Table 5). 
  La Porta et al. (2008) argue that omitted religious factors constitute the most 
serious threat to the findings in the literature on legal origin. We follow their remedy by 
controlling for (the fixed effects of) the main religion of the country. The main religions 
include Catholic, Muslim, Protestant and the rest (omitted category). Regression results 
in column 4 of Table 5 show that controlling for the main religion fixed effects hardly 
changes the estimated coefficient of our main interaction term. It changes from -0.109 
(column 3, Table 5) to -0.103 (column 4, Table 5) and remains significant at 5% level (p-
value of 0.038). Also, there is no significant change in the regression results for the 
remaining variables in the specification from above.   16
  In our last robustness check we control for the size of the country measured by the 
(log of) total population of the country, averaged over the 1990-1991 period 
(Population). Mulligan and Shleifer (2004) argue that running regulatory institutions 
takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given 
regulation are more likely to have them. They find that in a sample of over 70 countries, 
population is significantly positively correlated with a number of regulatory measures 
including the ones used in the present study. 
  Our main results easily survive controls for population as well as its interaction 
with the legal origin dummy and the political accountability variable. Adding Population 
to the list of controls above, the estimated coefficient of the main interaction term 
changed only slightly from -0.103 (column 4, Table 5) to -0.110 (not shown) and 
remained significant at 5% level (p-value of 0.028). As predicted by Mulligan and 
Shleifer, Population showed a positive correlation with the dependent variable but this 
was not statistically significant (at 10% level), perhaps due to the large number of 
controls in place. Next, we allowed the effect of population to vary with the legal origin 
of countries and the level of political accountability. Regression results reported in 
column 5 of Table 5 show that these additional controls do not affect our main result 
much. The estimated coefficient of our main interaction term remains negative and 
statistically significant (at 5% level). In fact, it is slightly bigger in magnitude with the 
population related controls than without them. For population, we find no significant 
variation in its effect across civil and common law countries or across high and low 
political accountability countries. 
   17
3.4 Instrumental variables (IV) regressions 
To address any remaining concerns regarding the reverse causality from business 
regulation to political accountability, we instrument political accountability using 
newspaper readership following the work of Perotti and Volpin (2007). Specifically, we 
use (log of) number of newspapers sold per capita in 1980 (Media) as the instrument.  
  To serve as a valid instrument for Constraints, Media should be highly correlated 
with constraints, and it should affect Procedures only through Constraints. Panel A of 
Table 6 shows the relationship between Media and Constraints. This relationship is 
economically large, statistically significant and positive and easily survives controls for 
income, education, legal origin, etc. For example, regressing Constraints on Media 
without any other controls, we find that the R-squared equals a high of 0.476 and a unit 
standard deviation increase in the value of Media is associated with 0.698 standard 
deviation increase in Constraints, significant at 1% level (column 1, Table 6). 
  Panel B of Table 6 reports the second stage instrumental variables (IV) regression 
results. In these regressions, values of Constraints are replaced by their predicted values 
(Constraints
IV) taken from the regression of Constraints on Media along with the various 
controls discussed above (listed in Panel A, Table 6) which we treat as included 
instruments.
6 The IV regressions confirm our main result discussed above. That is, the 
estimated coefficient of the main interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
(at 5% level) with or without the various controls. As an additional check, we also added 
the interaction terms between Media and income, education and population to the final 
specification in column 5, Panel B, Table 6. However, this did not change our main 
                                                 
6 Our main results do not change much if we first interact English and Media and use the predicted values 
of the interaction term (English*Media). The predicted values are obtained by regression 
English*Constraints on English*Media, with and without the various controls discussed above.   18
results much. The estimated coefficient of the main interaction term 
(English*Constraints
IV) changed only slightly from -0.310 (column 5, Panel B, Table 6) 
to -0.309 (not shown) and remained significant at 5% level (p-value of 0.029). 
 
4. Robustness to alternative measures of political and economic institutions 
4.1 Alternative measures of entry regulation and political accountability 
Regression results for the cost of starting a business as the dependent variable are 
provided in Table 7. The estimated coefficient of our main interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant at 1% level with and without the various controls. As above, 
controlling for the regional fixed effects causes the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term to rise (in absolute value) from -0.417 (column 1, Table 7) to -0.525 
(column 2, Table 7). The latter estimate implies that the value of Cost is lower in 
common law countries by 2.29 (against the sample mean of 3.65) at the highest value of 
Constraints and higher by 0.87 at the lowest value of Constraints. The former effect is 
significant at 1% level while the latter is insignificant at the 10% level or less. Adding the 
remaining controls discussed above does not change these results much (columns 3-7, 
Table 7).
7 
Regression results using Checks as a measure of political accountability are 
reported in Table 8 and are qualitatively similar to the ones discussed above. The 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5% level or 
less for both measures of entry regulation, with or without the various controls. As above, 
                                                 
7 The instrumental variables regression results using Cost as the dependent variable are almost similar to 
the ones discussed above for Procedures as the dependent variable (Table 6). The estimated coefficient of 
our main interaction term is negative and significant at close to the 1% level for all the specifications in 
Table 6. These results are not reported but available on request from the authors.   19
controlling for the regional fixed effects causes the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term to rise (in absolute value) although by a relatively small magnitude. The 
remaining controls too do not make much difference to the estimated coefficient of our 
main interaction term. 
  Lastly, we used (log of) number of days required to start a business as measured 
by the World Bank’s Doing Business project as the dependent variable. Results using this 
variable are roughly similar to the ones discussed above. For example, in our main 
specification (controlling for regional fixed effects), the estimated coefficient of our main 
interaction term was negative and statistically significant at close to the 1% level. It 
ranged between -0.257 and -0.301 in magnitude depending on which political 
accountability measure is used and whether the regional fixed effects are used or not. 
Roughly, common law countries show lower number of days to start a business than the 
civil law countries and the difference is significant at 5% level for the largest 40% of the 
values of the political accountability variables but insignificant otherwise. 
 
4.2 Cost of closing a business 
Regression results using the Cost of Closing a Business as the dependent variable are 
provided in Table 9 (using Constraints) and Table 10 (using Checks). These results are 
qualitatively similar to the ones discussed above, although slightly weaker in some of the 
specifications with the Checks variable. The estimated effect of legal origin on regulation 
varies sharply with the level of political accountability, significant at less than 5% level 
in most cases and at 10% level in the remaining cases (Table 10). In one sense, these 
results are even more startling than the ones for entry regulations. That is, without the   20
interaction term, legal origin has virtually no effect on the cost of closing a business 
(column 1, Tables 9, 10). Allowing for differential effect of legal origin on the dependent 
variable across countries with varying levels of political accountability, the difference 
between civil and common law countries becomes apparent. For example, using the 
Checks variable which shows slightly weaker results for our main interaction term than 
the Constraints variable, and our main specification (column 4, Table 10), the cost of 
closing a business is lower in common law relative to civil law countries by 0.772 
(against a mean value of 2.64 in the full sample) when political accountability is at its 
highest level. This difference of 0.772 is significant at 10% level (p-value of 0.075). In 
contrast, when political accountability is at its lowest level, the cost of closing a business 
is actually higher in the common law countries by 0.153 (p-value of 0.415). 
 
4.3 Business Freedom Index as dependent variable  
As a final robustness check, we used the (log of) Heritage Foundation’s Business 
Freedom index (BFI) as an alternative measure of business regulation.
8 The index is 
based on expert’s perception of how difficult it is for entrepreneurs to start a business, 
obtain licenses and close a business due to business regulations. Regression results using 
BFI (not reported) are similar to the ones we found above with the estimated coefficient 
of our main interaction term being negative, economically large and statistically 
significant at 5% level. Common law is associated with more business freedom (less 
regulation) than the civil law but this difference is statistically significant (and 
                                                 
8 Annual values of the BFI index are available from 1997-2007. Since 2006, the index is based purely on 
the Doing Business indicators of starting a business, obtaining (construction) permits and closing a 
business. Our results using the BFI index are roughly similar for index values before and after 2006.   21
economically large) only when political accountability is at a sufficiently high level and 
not otherwise. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Before ending this paper some discussion of our key results and potential caveats to them 
is in order. To begin with, some caution is necessary in interpreting our results regarding 
political accountability too narrowly. For example, the Polity IV project measures the 
overall quality of democracy in a country through four sub-components. These sub-
components include Constraints, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment and the competitiveness of participation which captures the extent 
to which alternative preferences to policies and leadership can be pursued in the political 
arena. These sub-components are all highly correlated. For example, the correlation 
between Constraints and the competitiveness of executive recruitment index (average 
value over 1980-89) equals 0.818. While this high correlation is not specific to the 
present study, it does suggest caution in attributing our results for Constraints and Checks 
too narrowly to political accountability rather than the quality of the broader political 
environment.
9  
  Next, some studies suggest that whether candidates are elected based on the 
proportion of votes received by the party (proportional representation) or not is a good 
predictor of the quality of political institutions. La Porta et. al. (2008) look at the effect of 
legal origin on a number of variables (including entry regulation) and use a proportional 
representation dummy as their main control for the quality of political institutions. 
                                                 
9 We share this problem with the broader literature on how political institutions affect economic outcomes. 
See, for example, Stasavage (2002).   22
However, we find only a weak correlation between the proportional representation 
dummy and our measures of political accountability. For example, the proportional 
representation dummy explains only 7.04% of the variation in Constraints and 3.6% in 
Checks. What this suggests is that the proportional representation system captures 
dimensions of the political environment other than political accountability. Perhaps for 
this reason, and similar to La Porta et al. (2008), we do not find any significant effect of 
proportional representation on the level of regulation. Further, the effect of common law 
on regulation shows no significant difference between countries that follow the 
proportional representation system and those that don’t. 
  Lastly, La Porta et. al. (2008) show that the level of regulation (as measured by 
Procedures) is lower in common law compared with civil law countries even for the 
sample of countries that have autocratic governments as identified by Przeworski et. al. 
(2000). However, our findings above seem to suggest otherwise. Political accountability 
is likely to be at the lower end in countries with autocratic governments so that the 
distinction between civil and common law (for the level of regulation) should be 
irrelevant for such countries. Closer inspection provides some light on why our results 
differ from those of La Porta et. al. That is, there is substantial overlap in the level of 
political accountability across autocratic and non-autocratic countries and only 20% of 
the variation in Constraints and 12.9% in Checks can be explained by autocracy vs. non-
autocracy.
10 Hence, it seems that the autocratic and non-autocratic distinction does not 
properly capture the variation across countries in the level of political accountability as 
                                                 
10 The relatively weak relationship between autocracy and political accountability is not too surprising 
because Przeworski et. al. classify many countries as autocratic even when these countries had only a brief 
spell of autocratic governments. For example, Cameroon is classified as an autocratic country but it had 
only one year of autocratic government (1971-1972) during the 1960-1990 period covered by the study.   23
defined in the present paper. As a further check, we controlled for the dummy indicating 
if a country is autocratic or not and also its interaction with the legal origin dummy. 
However, this did not change our main results much from above and we did not find any 
significant difference in the effect of legal origin across autocratic and non-autocratic 
countries.
11 
To conclude, the theory of legal origin suggests that common law countries are 
more inclined towards private freedom, protection of private property and less 
involvement of the state in the functioning of the economy than the civil law countries. 
The present paper attempts to look at entry regulation in a cross-section of 90 civil and 
common law countries. We find that while common law countries regulate entry of new 
businesses less than the civil law countries, the difference between them is significant 
only when political accountability is high. In countries with low political accountability, 
the distinction between civil and common law traditions does not matter for the extent of 
entry regulation. Consistent with the broader literature on political economy, the finding 
suggests that while the ideology of greater private freedom and judicial independence in 
the common law versus civil law countries is important for explaining business 
regulation, these are likely to have desirable effects only when political institutions 
provide the necessary enforcement guarantee. 
  We believe that the present work offers a number of exciting opportunities for 
future work. For example, the legal tradition of a country is known to be highly 
correlated with the level of financial development of countries. It will useful to check if 
                                                 
11 For example, using Procedures, Constraints and all the controls discussed above (specification in column 
5, Table 4), the estimated coefficient of our main interaction term changed from -0.160 (column 5, Table 5) 
to -0.155 (p-value of 0.005) when we controlled for a dummy indicating if a country is autocratic and also 
its interaction with the common law dummy. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term between 
autocracy and common law dummies equaled -0.052 with a p-value of 0.751.   24
this relationship is uniform or varies with the level of political accountability. A similar 
case can be made for other covariates of legal origin such as the quality of contract 
enforcement, regulation of the labor market and corruption. We hope that the present 
paper stimulates more research along these lines.   25
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Figure 1   29
 
 




































1. X axis in the figure measures Constraints 
2. Y axis measures the change in Procedures when we move from civil to common law 
(from column 4, Table 4) for various values of Constraints along with the 95% 
confidence interval. 
3. The solid line in the figure (marked as “Estimated effect”) is the estimated value of 
English+English*Constraints for various values of Constraints. The remaining two lines 
show the 95% confidence interval for the estimated values.   30
 
Table 1: Description of Main Variables 
Variable Description 
Procedures  Log of average value of the number of procedures 
required to start a new business. The average is taken 
over all years (2003-08) for which data are available. 
Source: Doing Business project, World Bank.  
www.doingbusiness.org. 
Cost  Log of average cost incurred to meet all regulatory 
requirements to start a business. The cost is expressed 
as a percentage of per capita income of the country. 
The average is taken over all years (2003-08) for 
which data are available. 
Source: Doing Business project, World Bank.  
www.doingbusiness.org. 
Cost of Closing a Business  Log of average value of the cost of closing a business. 
The average is taken over all years for which data are 
available. The cost is expressed as a percentage of the 
estate’s value. 
Source: Doing Business project, World Bank. 
www.doingbusiness.org. 
English  A dummy variable equal to 1 for a country that 
follows the English common law and 0 otherwise 
(French civil law country). 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Constraints 
 
Number of constraints on the executive. We use 
average values of the index over the period 1980-89. 
Source: Polity IV database. 
Checks  An index of political accountability developed by 
Beck et al. (1999). The index is a count of the number 
of veto players in the government. We use average 
value of the index taken over the period 1980-89.  
Source: Beck et al. (1999) 
Income  Log of average value of GDP per capita (PPP adjusted 
and in constant 2000 USD). The average is taken over 
annual values over the period 1990-99. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Education  Log of average value of the gross primary enrollment 
rate. The average is taken over annual values over the 
period 1990-99. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Region fixed effects:   
        Africa  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is located in 
the African continent and 0 otherwise. 
      Europe & North America  A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country located in 
Western Europe or North America (Canada and 
U.S.A.) and 0 otherwise.   31
Religion fixed effects  Dummy variables that indicate the main religion of 
the country. The main religions are Catholic, 
Protestant, Muslim and the (omitted) residual category 
of the rest. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Population  Log of average value of total population of the 
country where the average is taken over the period 
1990-1999. 
Source; World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Media  Log of number of newspapers sold per capita in 1980. 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the World, 3rd edition; 
(The main primary data source is UNESCO) 
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Procedures  90 2.265  0.425  (0.693,  2.944) 
Cost  90 3.651  1.659  (-1.609,  7.033) 
Cost of Closing a Business  81 2.642  0.622  (0.693,  4.344) 
English  90 0.344  0.478  (0,  1) 
Constraints  90 3.850  1.820  (1,  7) 
Checks  90 2.048  1.369  (1,  7.1) 
Income  90 8.140  1.320  (5.631,  10.552) 
Education  87 4.423  0.352  (3.325,  4.792) 
Population  90 16.349  1.425  (13.085,  20.644) 
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Table 3: Correlations 
Panel A: Full sample 
  English Constraints Checks  Income Education  Procedures  Cost   
English  1             
Constraints  0.171  1          
Checks  0.186  0.775  1         
Income  -0.018 0.626  0.599  1         
Education  0.137 0.487  0.415  0.586  1      
Procedures  -0.352 -0.480  -0.464  -0.395 -0.211  1     
Cost  -0.218 -0.602  -0.595  -0.768 -0.512  0.591  1   
Cost of Closing 
a Business 
0.023 -0.250  -0.244  -0.388 -0.136  0.328 0.545   
Panel B: Excluding Western Europe and North America 
  English Constraints Checks  Income Education  Procedures  Cost   
English  1             
Constraints  0.184  1          
Checks  0.272  0.716  1         
Income  -0.042 0.457  0.387  1         
Education  0.146 0.440  0.387  0.561  1      
Procedures  -0.329 -0.360  -0.275  -0.257 -0.152  1     
Cost  -0.176 -0.478  -0.429  -0.717 -0.487  0.487  1   
Cost of Closing 
a Business 
0.066 -0.088  -0.045  -0.282 -0.070  0.194 0.486   
Panel C: Residuals 
  English Constraints Checks  Income Education  Procedures  Cost  
English  1             
Constraints  0.269  1          
Checks  0.296  0.553  1         
Income  0.016 0.179  0.114  1        
Education  0.223 0.203  0.125  0.272  1      
Procedures  -0.392 -0.314  -0.264  -0.160 -0.045  1     
Cost  -0.310 -0.284  -0.270  -0.563 -0.266  0.491  1   
Cost of Closing 
a Business 
-0.007 0.035  0.063  -0.145 0.070  0.215 0.417   
Panel D: Residuals and the original values of the variables 
  English Constraints Checks  Income Education Procedures  Cost 
English  0.998            




Checks     0.665           
Income      0.617         
Education        0.797       
Procedures          0.914     
Cost            0.771   
Cost of Closing a Business           0.919 
“Residuals” are obtained by regressing each variable on two dummies: Africa and Europe & North America. These 
dummy variables are defined in Table 1 along with the rest of the variables. 
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Table 4: Main results 
Dependent variable: Procedures 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)   
Panel A 
          





















          













          
Africa   
 
    0.092 
(0.190) 
 
        
Europe & North America   
 




          
R
2  0.124  0.231 0.306 0.399 0.441   
Observations 
(No. of countries) 
90  90 90 90 90   
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance levels are 
denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
 
Panel B 
Critical values of Constraints (percentile values in brackets) above which English has a 
statistically significant (at the 5% level) negative effect on the dependent variable: 
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Table 5: Main specification with controls 
Dependent variable: Procedures       
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 





































Region fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 































































Religion fixed effects     Yes 
 
Yes 
Population    
 
   -0.044 
(0.477) 
English*Population    
 
   0.019 
(0.710) 
Constraints*Population   
 
   0.016 
(0.243) 
         
R
2  0.453 0.456 0.536  0.545  0.562 
Observations 
(No. of countries)  87 87 87  87  87 
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance levels 
are denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Panel A: First stage IV regressions 
      




























Region fixed effects     Yes  Yes  Yes 




















Religion fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
English*Income       -0.077 
(0.803) 
English*Education       1.49 
(0.364) 
English*Population       0.328 
(0.151) 
F-test (joint significance 

















2  0.476 0.479 0.628 0.701  0.719 
Observations  74 74 74 74  74 
 
Panel B: Second stage IV regressions  
       
Dependent variable: Procedures       
English*Constraints
IV 

































Observations    74 74 74  74 
1) Regression results in Panel B include all the controls listed in the corresponding 
column in Panel A. For each column, Constraints
IV are the predicted values of 
Constraints from the corresponding column in Panel A. 
2) p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance levels 
are denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less).  
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Table 7: Results using Cost of Starting a Business 
Dependent variable: Cost        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






















































Region fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




























































Constraints*Education   
 







Religion fixed effects       Yes 
 
Yes 
Population    
 
     -0.394
** 
(0.030) 
English*Population    
 
     0.100 
(0.528) 
Constraints*Population   
 
     0.042 
(0.314) 
R
2  0.426  0.566 0.704 0.716 0.728 0.740 0.766 
Observations 
(No. of countries)  90  90 90 90 90 90 90 
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance levels are denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** 
(5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
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Table 8: Results using Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable 


































































 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 



















English*Income      0.043 
(0.539) 
    0476
* 
(0.069) 
English*Education     -0.413
* 
(0.086) 
     -1.88 
(0.124) 
Checks*Income   
 
   -0.16
*** 
(0.000) 
     -0.186
** 
(0.024) 
Checks*Education   
 
  0.122 
(0.585) 
     -0.488 
(0.334) 
Religion fixed effects     Yes      Yes 
Population    
 
  -0.045 
(0.357) 
     -0.276
** 
(0.035) 





     0.158 
(0.301) 





    0.011 
(0.839) 
R
2  0.335  0.368  0.388  0.564 0.384  0.508  0.678 0.768 
Observations 
(Countries) 
90  90 
87  87 
90  90  87 87 
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance levels are denoted by 
*** (1% 
or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
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Table 9: Results using Cost of Closing a Business 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Cost of Closing a Business     
         































Region fixed effects 
 
    Yes  Yes 
Income         -0.426
** 
(0.021) 
Education         0.288 
(0.680) 
English*Income   
 
     0.478
*** 
(0.003) 
English*Education   
 
     -2.16
*** 
(0.001) 
Constraints*Income   
 
     0.031
 
(0.485) 
Constraints*Education       0.090 
(0.723) 
Religion fixed effects      
 
Yes 
Population         -0.008 
(0.945) 
English*Population         -0.062 
(0.484) 
Constraints*Population       0.022 
(0.413) 
         
R
2  0.001  0.062  0.127 0.249 0.454 
Observations 
(No. of countries)  81  81  81 81 78 
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance 
levels are denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
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Table 10: Results using Cost of Closing a Business 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Cost of Closing a Business    
         





























Region fixed effects 
 
    Yes  Yes 
Income         -0.283
 
(0.102) 
Education         0.789 
(0.205) 
English*Income   
 
     0.492
*** 
(0.009) 
English*Education   
 
     -2.33
*** 
(0.000) 
Checks*Income   
 
     -0.010
 
(0.867) 
Checks*Education       -0.336 
(0.488) 
Religion fixed effects      
 
Yes 
Population         0.043 
(0.621) 
English*Population         -0.056 
(0.578) 
Checks*Population       0.016 
(0.641) 
         
R
2  0.001  0.059  0.088 0.186 0.413 
Observations 
(No. of countries)  81  81  81 81 78 
p-values in brackets; all standard errors are Huber-While robust; significance 
levels are denoted by 
*** (1% or less), 
** (5% or less) and 
* (10% or less). 
 